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The bilateral relationship with Japan now dominates American thinking 
on the benefits and costs of foreign trade. Japan has become the model 
of all things modern and efficient, the standard against which the United 
States measures its own economy and finds itself wanting. But Japan 
is also firmly established as  the villain in the industrial adjustment woes 
that have plagued the United States in recent years; most Americans 
remain unaware that Japan has encountered many of the same diffi- 
culties in  reducing excess capacity, often in the same industries. 
Such paradoxes typify the intense and stormy relationship between 
the  world’s  economic superpowers. Against a background  of  ever- 
increasing bilateral imbalances, ever-escalating protectionist  rhetoric, 
and even some action at the official level, individual Americans con- 
tinue to vote with their dollars for still more Japanese imports. Can 
U.S. producers hope to reverse the trend? Can American consumers 
be  persuaded  to give  up their Toyotas  and  their Sonys in  favor  of 
domestic goods? These questions are themselves rapidly  becoming 
obsolete. Thanks to the recent flood of Japanese direct investments 
into U.S. manufacturing industries,  it is now often possible to “buy 
American” without sacrificing Japanese design and quality. 
This chapter reevaluates the past and future course of United States- 
Japan economic relations. The first section asks whether there is indeed 
a “Japan problem” and, if  so, exactly what that problem is. Section 
10.2 examines the macroeconomic  roots of the United States-Japan 
bilateral trade imbalance and weighs alternative macroeconomic rem- 
edies. Section 10.3 deals with trade issues at the sectoral level. Section 
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10.4 reviews the technological rivalry between the United States and 
Japan. Section 10.5 draws some conclusions and looks to the future of 
the relationship. 
10.1  Is There a Japan Problem? 
Given the surfeit of recent writings, both scholarly and popular, on 
the unprecedented  size and continuing growth of  the United States- 
Japan trade imbalance, it may  seem odd to ask what the problem is, 
let alone whether a problem exists. Yet  in some important respects, 
Japan is perhaps better  seen as part of the solution rather than the 
source of the problem. To  see why, it is helpful to examine the various 
aspects of  the  United  States-Japan  economic relationship  that may 
underlie the continuing friction. Here there are at least  six possible 
candidates: (I) growing bilateral imbalance on merchandise trade, par- 
ticularly on trade in manufactured goods; (2) growing net capital inflows 
from Japan to the United States; (3) the yen/dollar exchange rate and 
perhaps also the present  system of exchange rate determination; (4) 
sectoral nontariff barriers (whether real or imagined) limiting Japanese 
imports of U.S. products, Japanese trade-distorting industrial policies, 
and export incentives depriving U.S. firms of  sales at home and  in 
third-country markets; (5)  successful emulation by Japan of the tech- 
nological supremacy of  U.S.  industry; and (6) social, economic, polit- 
ical, and cultural differences between the two nations. 
These categories are not mutually exclusive. Automotive products 
loom so large in total bilateral trade that this “sectoral”  issue neces- 
sarily has implications for aggregate imbalances. The narrowing tech- 
nological gap is intimately linked to the sectoral composition of trade 
and is itself affected by Japanese policies to promote economic growth. 
And while cultural and social conditions in, say, Indonesia are equally 
exotic to an American observer, Americans are much more interested 
in-and  worried about-contrasts  between Japan and the United States 
precisely because of the growing economic rivalry. Still, it is helpful 
to  sort  out the  relative  importance  of  each  type  of  irritant  and  to 
examine the main causes and potential remedies in each. 
10.1.1  Aggregate Imbalance 
Highly aggregated measures of  bilateral interaction are regarded by 
most economists as the visible “symptoms”  of underlying macroeco- 
nomic conditions-and,  specifically, not caused either by  defects of 
trade or industrial policies at home or by skillful application of the same 
abroad. While the symptoms are themselves problematic, the causes 
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roeconomic level. Yet the justification of every new proposal for trade 
legislation prominently features the latest hitherto unimaginable data 
on  the  nation’s global external  imbalance  and  bilateral  deficit with 
Japan-with  the strong implication that tough new trade policies (or 
creative new competitiveness policies) are the measures required for 
the United States to redress the present imbalance. 
10.1.2  Capital Inflows 
Matching Japanese global surpluses on merchandise trade and cur- 
rent account are massive foreign investments. The recent rates have 
been rivaled only by the petrodollar flood of the 1970s. But the petro- 
dollars were recycled primarily through the Eurodollar market and went 
ultimately to many borrowers.  In contrast, Japanese funds (autodol- 
lars?) have in large measure moved directly into U.S. financial markets. 
Thus, while there  is no conceptual reason  why  the  nation’s  largest 
bilateral merchandise trade deficit and its largest bilateral capital ac- 
count surplus should be with the same trading partner, it is certainly 
true in this instance. If  the oil surpluses had materialized later, or if 
U.S. fiscal policy had changed sooner, it is likely that more liabilities 
of  the U.S. Treasury would now be held by  Saudi Arabia and fewer 
by Japan. 
The rapidly growing U.S. official debt to foreigners (or, indeed, to 
anyone) raises important issues of intergenerational equity. However, 
the concerns of  many Americans focus on one particular component 
of the capital inflows, direct foreign investments in U.S. industries. On 
the one hand, state and local officials vie to attract new investments- 
jobs and the future tax base are the main reasons. But domestic firms 
worry about new competition as well as the effects on their own labor 
costs and taxes. 
Apparently oblivious to U .S.  official insistence on national treatment 
by foreign governments for U.S. subsidiaries abroad, the president of 
Ford Motor Company called in early 1987 for further reductions in auto 
imports from Japan, to compensate for increased production by Jap- 
anese plants in the United States. In the troubled U.S. semiconductor 
industry, national  security concerns  were  raised  in  objection  to the 
proposed acquisition of  Fairchild Semiconductor by  Fujitsu, Japan’s 
largest computer company. 
10.1.3  The Dollar/Yen Exchange Rate 
The exchange rate, too, is viewed by economists as fundamentally 
a symptom rather than a cause. However, the relationships determining 
exchange rate movements are poorly understood. Professional opinion 
remains divided particularly on the appropriate role and effectiveness 308  Rachel McCulloch 
of official intervention in foreign exchange markets, either directly, via 
purchases or sales of foreign exchange, or indirectly, via manipulation 
of discount rates. 
Through  1985, dollar strength offered a plausible explanation of the 
nation’s growing deficit on merchandise trade. But the subsequent dra- 
matic decline in the dollar failed to induce a corresponding turnaround 
in  U.S. trade performance.  Analysts  then rushed  in  to explain  the 
nonevent with  traditional  J-curves and  newer  “hysteresis”  effects. 
While differing in  their  microeconomic  underpinnings,  both theories 
suggest that for foreign trade, what goes up does not necessarily come 
down, or at least not as quickly as policymakers would like. As a result 
of continuing growth in the U.S. trade deficit, a yen/dollar exchange 
rate of  160, seen in  1986 by  U.S. officials  as an appropriate policy 
target, had given way to target values of 140 or below by mid-1987. 
10.1.4  Who Is the Problem? 
While the domestic consequences of large bilateral imbalances and 
major exchange rate movements surely constitute unsolved problems 
for U.S. policymakers, it is difficult to make a convincing case that the 
basic  fault  lies  with  the Japanese rather than  elsewhere. True, the 
imbalances reflect mismatch between  the macroeconomic  conditions 
and policies of Japan and the United States. But if  the main problem 
is simply the large aggregate imbalance, the main cause is macroeco- 
nomic policy in the United States. 
Indeed, only Japan’s offsetting surpluses permitted the U.S. econ- 
omy to enjoy moderate growth during the 1980s while continuing on 
an unchanged macroeconomic course. In retrospect, perhaps the United 
States should have altered  its fiscal policies  sooner. Does that mean 
Japan is at fault for leaving the United States “free to choose” instead 
of  being forced to confront  immediately the full  implications of  its 
actions? 
10.1.5  Sectoral Distortions 
Although customarily raised along with the issue of growing bilateral 
imbalance,  sectoral trade distortions present a conceptually different 
type of  problem for the United  States. The primary  effect of  such 
policies is to reduce the mutual benefits from trade based on compar- 
ative advantage. While individual firms and even industries often stand 
to gain from distortive sectoral policies, national gains from export 
promotion  or import restriction  are likely to be the exception rather 
than the rule.2 
The conclusion that trade policies, whether good or bad, affect mainly 
the composition of trade rather than the aggregate balance stems from 
a general equilibrium view of economic activity. Simply put, although 309  United States-Japan  Economic Relations 
a trade policy may change the balance of trade for a particular product 
or even an industry, offsets arise via induced movements in exchange 
rates and input costs, foreign retaliation, and other indirect channels3 
Likewise, any positive employment effects in  a specific sector are 
offset by reduced employment opportunities in other areas. Moreover, 
to the extent that the jobs “saved” are in relatively inefficient firms or 
in activities where the United States has lost comparative advantage, 
the overall composition of employment opportunities may be adversely 
affe~ted.~  Still, this does not alter the important economic and political 
issues raised by the distribution of the gains from maintaining relatively 
open international markets. 
A separate concern is the changing composition of U.S. production. 
If the level of domestic activity in particular manufacturing industries 
has important positive effects on other parts of the economy, loss of 
market share in such “strategic”  activities could reduce future U.S. 
industrial competitiveness across the board. No clear evidence of such 
externalities is yet available, but  some fear that further delay in re- 
versing present  trends  may  leave the  United  States at a permanent 
competitive disadvantage. 
10.1.6  How Important Are Trade Distortions? 
The existence of subtle trade-distorting policies and industrial prac- 
tices on the part of Japan is acknowledged by almost all international 
economists. The more interesting question is how important such pol- 
icies are in shaping the overall relationship between Japan and the rest 
of the world, and particularly with the United States. While there are 
differences of opinion concerning the importance of such distortions 
to the performance of individual sectors (see, for example, Borrus and 
Zysman 1985), there is broad agreement that the consequences for the 
size of the aggregate imbalance are minor. 
Even when there are significant benefits to be achieved by negotiating 
reductions in sectoral trade distortions, it is crucial that this task be 
divorced from the more pressing macroeconomic  issue^.^ The persis- 
tent linkage of  aggregate and sectoral issues allows policymakers  to 
delay needed macroeconomic remedies and promotes U.S. allegations 
of bad faith on the part of Japanese officials when inappropriate means 
fail to achieve their stated ends. 
10.1.7  Technological Rivalry 
Perhaps most significant to the long-range development of the United 
States-Japan  relationship is the successful emulation by Japan of  U .S. 
technology-based  economic growth. While many nations have sought 
to close the technology gap with the United States, only Japan has come 
so far so fast. Once primarily an importer and adapter of technologies 310  Rachel McCulloch 
developed elsewhere, Japan now rivals the United States in many areas 
of industrial innovation. 
Japan’s challenge to U.S. technological supremacy has important 
implications for the composition of bilateral trade flows. Through much 
of the post-World  War I1 period, access to superior technology allowed 
the United States to compete effectively on world markets while main- 
taining average wages well above those abroad. U.S. industrial exports 
were increasingly concentrated in the high-technology industries, while 
the remainder of U.S.  manufacturing lost ground to foreign suppliers. 
But with the loss of its decisive technological lead, U.S. industry can 
no longer compete on the basis of unique products or advanced pro- 
cesses alone. As a consequence, earnings in  U.S.  manufacturing are 
becoming more closely linked to those in Japan and other nations with 
access to advanced technologies and to the capital required to imple- 
ment them. 
Another long-term issue is the influence of the “Japanese model” 
of  industrial  development on policy  choices of  developing  nations, 
especially in  Asia.  Does the future hold  “many Japans”  competing 
with the United States in world markets? South Korea is often labeled 
the next Japan because of its successes in promoting the same export 
industries-successes  fostered in part by North American and Euro- 
pean trade discrimination directed at Japan’s most competitive export 
industries. Nationalistic Koreans reject the implied linkage with its one- 
time oppressor but often privately admire Japan’s economic strategy. 
Other newly industrializing nations are also studying Japan’s industrial 
policy and in some cases adopting certain elements. The specter of a 
world economy dominated by many nations all saving, innovating, and 
exporting at Japanese rates raises obvious concerns in the West. 
Beyond the important but narrow issue of increased competition in 
high-technology  manufacturing  industries, the challenge to the U .S. 
lead in scientific and technological areas may have implications for the 
nation’s key role in global security systems. This latter issue is linked 
to  the ambivalence  of the United States and its allies regarding increases 
in  Japan’s  military  expenditures. Japan’s  military  budget  for  1987 
broached the “one percent threshold” relative to gross national product 
for the first time since the end of World War 11. 
10.1.8  Being Different 
The final  but by  no means minor problem area in  United  States- 
Japan relations arises from the myriad social, political, and economic 
structures of the Japanese nation that contrast so sharply with their 
U.S. counterparts. While the net contribution of these differences to 
relative economic performance and to the bilateral imbalances remains 
largely  in  the realm  of conjecture, many  serious suggestions for re- 311  United States-Japan  Economic Relations 
lieving tensions between the two nations are based on efforts to reduce 
these differences, whether by making the United States more like Japan 
(higher savings, quality circles, a cabinet-level Department of  Trade 
and Industry) or by making Japan  more like the United  States (de- 
ductability  of  mortgage interest, shorter work  week, bigger defense 
budget). Made forcefully, such suggestions in effect challenge the rel- 
evance of traditional notions of national sovereignty in an increasingly 
interdependent world economy. 
The importance of  the many departures of Japanese governmental 
and business practice from Western norms remains an area of contro- 
versy even among scholars. Overall, political scientists such as Johnson 
(1982) seem more willing than economists to attribute Japanese indus- 
trial and trade successes to unique structural features. But even econ- 
omists are divided on the importance of Japanese industrial policy and 
government-firm relationships in comparison to a high savings rate as 
key factors underlying the “Japanese miracle.” 
Contrasting economic and political systems also complicate the nar- 
rower issue of  what constitutes a level playing field in  trade and in- 
vestment matters. Allegations of sectoral trade distortions often arise 
from differences in administrative structure and industrial organization. 
So far, neither U.S. trade law nor the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT) has been able to deal effectively with the resulting 
disputes. Bilateral negotiations and ad hoc agreements, often short- 
lived, remain the major approach for addressing United States-Japan 
sectoral trade conflicts. 
A darker side of the contrasts between the two nations lies below 
the surface. The overt U.S. racism of the World War I1 era has receded, 
but subtle racism is a plausible explanation for the very different official 
and private attitudes of Americans toward Japan (and the newly in- 
dustrializing “four little dragons” of Asia) and toward Canada or Eu- 
rope. Government officials and the media pass up no opportunity to 
remind the public of the gargantuan US.  deficit on trade with Japan, 
but how many Americans realize that the nation’s second largest bi- 
lateral deficit is on trade with Canada?6 
However, racial prejudice  is  a two-way  street, as Prime Minister 
Nakasone’s well-publicized gaffe in  1986  amply demonstrated.  In  a 
nation where careful checks of  ancestry are part of  the usual prepa- 
ration for marriage, many Japanese privately view the eclipse of U.S. 
industrial might as the inevitable consequence of its ethnic and racial 
diversity. 
On this last score there may be grounds for some modest optimism. 
The intensification of  economic ties  between the  United  States and 
Japan has promoted a great desire on the part of each nation for better 
understanding of  the other. Even if  the primary  motivation on each 312  Rachel McCulloch 
side springs from the lure of a large and lucrative foreign market, the 
resulting familiarity with a previously alien and inscrutable society can 
help to smooth those frictions based on differences alone. 
10.2  Macroeconomic Roots of U.S. International Imbalance 
Like an economic Sputnik, the rapid growth of the U.S. trade im- 
balance galvanized the American public. To many observers, escalation 
of the U.S. trade deficit in the 1980s was simply tangible and dramatic 
evidence of  the nation’s declining industrial competitiveness, in turn 
reflecting erosion of the commanding lead in science and technology 
the United States once enjoyed. Others variously sought explanations 
in trade-distorting practices abroad, export disincentives at home, and 
poor management practices of  U.S. companies. Likewise, Japan’s ever- 
increasing surpluses were interpreted either as evidence of Japanese 
bad faith in complying with agreements to open its markets to foreign 
goods or as confirmation of the wisdom of Japanese private and public 
economic management. 
Each explanation spawned a detailed agenda of private and public 
action designed to arrest the decline. As with any broad policy initia- 
tive, both wise and foolish proposals have been advanced in the name 
of increased competitiveness. But for reasons discussed below, most 
of these proposals would do nothing to reduce the aggregate imbalance.’ 
10.2.1  The U.S.  Budget Deficit 
While the competitiveness frenzy continued unabated, an alternative 
analysis offered a very different assessment of  the forces underlying 
rapid escalation of the U.S. trade deficit. According to this view, pro- 
moted  as early  as  1982 by  the Council of  Economic Advisors,  the 
growth of the trade deficit was the largely predictable result of a single 
important macroeconomic development in the United States: a major 
increase in the size of  the federal budget deficit. The corresponding 
prescription for restoration of  U.S. competitiveness: cut the budget 
deficit. 
The Council’s macroeconomic explanation, initially met by disbelief 
and even ridicule, gained broad acceptance as the continued tandem 
rise of the “twin  deficits”  offered further circumstantial evidence in 
support of a linkage. The basic insight was, at least after the fact, a 
rather simple one. The large increase in  the federal deficit translated 
into a comparable drop in  the nation’s total saving, pushing up U.S. 
interest rates. Drawn in by higher rates, foreign funds filled the gap. 
But the foreign demand for U.S. assets also drove up the value of the 
dollar, pricing U.S. goods out of many markets at home and abroad. 
Thus, rather than crowding out domestic capital formation  as some 313  United States-Japan  Economic Relations 
had  initially feared, the  larger federal deficit crowded out domestic 
production of tradable goods. 
Like most simple explanations, this one was too simple. The analysis 
focused on the U.S. demand for foreign funds but slighted important 
factors that influenced the supply of those funds to the U.S. market. 
While the enlarged federal deficit alone would have put upward pressure 
on domestic interest rates and promoted U.S.  capital inflows, the actual 
size of those inflows was also the result of important “supply” factors 
in international capital markets. 
10.2.2  Capital Inflows and Exchange Rates 
In addition to its neglect of factors influencing the supply of funds 
to U.S. borrowers, the conventional  wisdom implied that the appre- 
ciation  of  the dollar was a necessary  consequence of  the inflow of 
foreign funds. In fact, the theoretical consequences of a financial trans- 
fer for the exchange rate are ambiguous, depending crucially on spend- 
ing patterns  at home and abroad.  The more  similar those  spending 
patterns and the larger the proportion of total expenditure devoted to 
tradable goods, the less the exchange rate  would  have to move  to 
“effect” the transfer of current purchasing power to the United States. 
Thinking in these terms helps explain how the dollar could fall so 
much with capital inflows still rising. The prolonged period of  a very 
strong dollar caused permanent changes in consumer information and 
in  producer costs of serving the U.S. market. Specifically, at a given 
exchange rate, more  U.S. consumers would choose foreign products 
over their domestic counterparts when priced comparably in dollars, 
while foreign producers would be able to set lower dollar prices for 
goods aimed at the U.S. market. Both types of changes are hysteresis 
effects. They rest on once-and-for-all changes in  demand and supply 
conditions, rather than on the short-term sluggishness, especially of 
demand, that underlies the J-curve analysk8 
10.2.3  The Supply of Foreign Funds 
If growth in the federal budget deficit explains the greatly increased 
U.S. appetite for foreign funds, it is only one of many reasons why 
foreign lenders stood ready to satisfy that appetite. Other factors in- 
fluencing the supply of  foreign funds to U.S. capital markets can be 
grouped into three categories. Of these, two apply to lenders generally 
(including U.S. lenders, who cut back their own foreign loans in favor 
of  domestic alternatives), while the third  is specific to the most  im- 
portant foreign lender, Japan: (1)  increased attractiveness of  U.S. in- 
vestments, reflecting, among others, enhanced tax incentives for capital 
formation,  financial and  industrial  deregulation, repeal  of  the  with- 
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anti-inflationary macroeconomic policies; (2) reduced attractiveness of 
lending abroad, due to economic stagnation in much of Europe and the 
debt problems and capital flight affecting many less-developed coun- 
tries; and  (3) increased capital  outflows from Japan,  resulting from 
liberalization of  restrictions on capital outflows (accelerated at the re- 
quest of the United States as part of the 1984 dollar/yen agreement9) 
and lower Japanese budget deficits. Even without the large increase in 
U.S.  federal deficits, these factors would have tended to push the U.S. 
capital account toward surplus, putting upward pressure on the inter- 
national value of the dollar and downward pressure on U.S. merchan- 
dise trade performance. 
10.2.4  Stock Adjustments and Continuing Flows 
A further complication in the link between the U.S. budget deficit 
and U.S. borrowing from abroad is that the rise in the deficit created 
an ongoing demand for foreign capital, while the inflows from abroad 
have  reflected both  one-time  readjustments of  asset holdings in  re- 
sponse to new market conditions and ongoing supply effects. In the 
specific case of capital inflows from Japan, the liberalization of capiYa1 
outflows resulted in a sizable shift of accumulated Japanese assets into 
U.S. securities with higher yields. But the chronic surplus of Japanese 
private savings over domestic absorption of those savings (by domestic 
capital formation or government deficit spending) translates into an 
ongoing supply influence that can be expected to push new capital into 
world markets year after year. 
Over time, the resulting increases in foreign holdings of U.S. assets 
and in U.S.  holdings of foreign assets have direct implications for the 
composition of  the current account and for the relative value of  the 
dollar. The rising net indebtedness of  the United States should mean 
rising net outflows of interest and profits, pushing the U.S. services 
account toward deficit. For a given level of  net capital inflow, rising 
debt service entails a shrinking deficit on merchandise trade and less 
upward pressure on the value of the dollar.’O  This compositional effect 
within the balance of  payments would tend to reinforce the influence 
of hysteresis on equilibrium exchange rates. 
10.2.5  Correcting the Aggregate Imbalance 
Given the full set of  contributing macroeconomic conditions, what 
can be said about the outcomes of alternative corrective policies? The 
U.S.  external imbalance  reflects an  excess of  total  “absorption”- 
spending (public plus private) for both consumption and investment 
purposes-over production in the United States, and a corresponding 
shortfall of absorption relative to production abroad. Measures to re- 
duce the imbalance can seek to reduce the U.S. spending excess or to 
reduce the foreign shortfall. 315  United States-Japan  Economic Relations 
Reducing U.S.  Absorption 
The most obvious choices for direct U.S. action have become the 
bread and butter of national policy debate: raise taxes, cut government 
spending, or both. A third alternative for bringing total U.S. spending 
into line is to reduce domestic capital formation. This option, seldom 
explicitly considered, has obvious negative implications for the future 
growth of  U.S. productive capacity.  However, it may be chosen by 
default if policymakers are unable to cut total public and private spend- 
ing for other purposes,  or if  new taxes enacted to reduce the deficit 
also reduce incentives for domestic investment. 
Moreover, even a successful effort to reduce the budget deficit need 
not produce a comparable reduction in the nation's demand for capital 
imports. Although customarily  described  in  terms  of  the  increased 
federal deficit, the root of  the nation's  increased appetite for foreign 
funds (or, equivalently, of  its increased deficit on current account) is 
actually increased spending-specificall  y, the increase in total domestic 
absorption of goods and services. Because changes in the federal gov- 
ernment's plans for taxing and spending usually have important effects 
on decisions of state and local governments and of the private sector, 
merely reducing the federal deficit does not necessarily have a com- 
parable effect on total absorption; major offsets are possible." 
Raising Foreign Absorption 
As a practical matter, progress on deficit reduction has been slow in 
coming, and conflicts between President Reagan and the Democratic- 
controlled U.S. Congress are likely to make things even more difficult 
in 1987 and 1988. Meanwhile, Treasury Secretary James Baker 111 has 
pushed U.S. trading partners, especially West Germany and Japan, to 
assume more responsibility for effecting the desired adjustment. In the 
case of Japan, proposals have focused on means to reduce the Japanese 
savings surplus by  increasing domestic consumption and investment 
spending. This could perhaps be accomplished  by general economic 
stimulation, but the prospects are most favorable for narrowly targeted 
policies intended to raise specific components of Japanese spending. 
The two areas mentioned most often in this connection are housing 
and public works. For housing, relatively modest changes in Japanese 
tax laws and financial regulation could make mortgage-financed owner- 
occupied housing far more attractive than it is today, thereby presum- 
ably increasing total expenditures in that category and probably overall.  l2 
Increased government spending for highways, railroads, and espe- 
cially sewers is a second potential area of expanded domestic absorp- 
tion.  By  Western  standards,  Japanese  spending  in  these  areas  is 
surprisingly low.  Fewer  than  three Japanese households in  five are 
connected to a central sewer system; incredibly, the ratio is only about 316  Rachel McCulloch 
four out of five even in the Tokyo-Yokohama area, one of the world’s 
most densely populated urban centers (Japan 1986, 88). But second- 
guessing such domestic spending decisions seems of doubtful efficacy, 
and of even more doubtful appropriateness. 
One last area for a major increase in Japan’s domestic absorption is 
defense. Currently at a postwar high of just over one percent of gross 
national product, Japan’s defense expenditures are, for example, only 
about half those of neutral Switzerland and a third those of West Ger- 
many (Japan 1986,86). Other major U.S.  allies spend still more. Should 
the United States urge Japan to share more of the collective burden of 
global security? Viewed strictly on its economic merits, this seems a 
more appropriate area than housing or sewers for pressure from other 
nations.  However, proposals for a substantial increase in  Japanese 
defense spending have so far encountered formidable political resis- 
tance both in Japan and in the United States. 
While acknowledging that Japan’s capital account surplus mirrors 
the nation’s imbalance between saving and domestic investment, some 
analysts believe that the underlying macroeconomic imbalance is not 
appropriately viewed as exogenous. Rapp (1986) and Balassa  (1986) 
link high Japanese savings to profits generated by sectoral protection. 
If this effect were quantitatively important, import liberalization would, 
in  addition  to its  expected effects on sectoral composition  of  trade 
flows, raise Japanese domestic absorption and thus reduce the aggre- 
gate trade surplus. 
Redirecting Foreign Funds 
If the United States does not want Japan’s capital surpluses, perhaps 
other borrowers do. An important alternative to increasing Japanese 
domestic absorption is redirecting Japan’s foreign lending toward other 
nations,  especially  less-developed  nations.  Debt  problems  have  led 
many developing nations to restrict imports of capital equipment sup- 
plied  by  the  United  States and other industrial  nations.  With  more 
purchasing  power at  their  disposal, these  nations  would  be  able to 
resume such imports; U.S. exporters would benefit accordingly. 
In the past decade Japan has increased by nearly 50 percent its share 
of  GNP devoted to official development  assistance, while the U.S. 
share, initially the same (0.24 percent), remained unchanged. But com- 
pared to other prosperous nations, Japan’s spending is still on the low 
side. 
Although the Japanese have in fact continued to step up their spend- 
ing for foreign aid, the increases have not always met with cheers from 
other donor nations. The problem arises from informal arrangements 
that link aid to expenditures for Japanese goods and services. While 
little  aid  is  explicitly tied,  aid  is  rarely  committed without  specific 
project plans; potential borrowers rely on Japanese expert advice in 317  United States-Japan  Economic Relations 
formulating the  plans,  which typically  call for imports  of  Japanese 
capital equipment and other products. Mixed-credit financing is a re- 
lated problem, although Japan has not been the major offender in this 
area. 
Commercial  lending and direct foreign investments  in  developing 
countries are other means by which Japanese surplus savings could be 
“recycled.”  Given the ongoing debt problems of many developing na- 
tions, this route currently looks hazardous to both potential  lenders 
and potential borrowers. In the longer term, however, it is likely that 
“normal”  capital-flow relations between rich and poor nations will be 
reestablished, with funds from Japan playing an important role. 
Taxing Capital Imports 
Only the net inflow of  capital from abroad has kept the greatly in- 
creased federal deficit from pushing  U.S.  interest rates through the 
roof. Instead, the U.S. trade deficit has gone through the roof. Until 
U.S. domestic absorption can be cut, the nation will continue to face 
the same basic choice between high interest rates and foreign borrow- 
ing. Over time, the exact terms of the trade-off will depend on investors’ 
preferences, but the United States can tilt that choice by taxing capital 
imports.13 
Controlling U.S. capital imports would shift a greater part of the 
adjustment to higher deficits onto U.S. lenders and borrowers, rather 
than allowing much of the “crowding out” to be exported. From the 
U.S.  perspective, the effect is similar to what would be obtained via 
expansion abroad. However, there are two potentially important dif- 
ferences. First, without specific expansionary policies in place abroad, 
imposition of capital controls by the United States could push the rest 
of  the world into a deflationary spiral.  Second, and perhaps key for 
some U.S. officials, capital controls would reverse recent U.S. gains 
in  penetrating  foreign  (especially  Japanese)  markets  for  financial 
services. 
10.3  Sectoral Issues 
Allegations about Japan’s relatively  closed  markets  for industrial 
products reflect concerns of  much longer standing than the aggregate 
imbalances of  recent years. The encroachment of Japanese products 
into the U.S. market and their displacement of U.S. exports in markets 
elsewhere is likewise an old story, not a new one. However, emergence 
of  a very  large bilateral  imbalance has  exacerbated  those  longtime 
concerns, since the impact of competition with Japan is concentrated 
in a small number of  U.S. manufacturing industries.14 
Bilateral friction on agricultural trade is also an old story. However, 
with U.S. global surpluses on agricultural trade shrinking rapidly, one 318  Rachel McCulloch 
consequence has been renewed focus on the import barriers of Japan, 
already the largest market for U.S. agricultural exports. Changes in 
Japan’s current policies in support of domestic agriculture, and espe- 
cially of rice farming, could mean still larger imports of food from the 
United States. But, like other industrialized nations, Japan has so far 
found reductions in its expensive agricultural support policies politi- 
cally unpalatable.  Indeed, were the United States to reform its own 
costly and distortionary policies toward agriculture as it has urged the 
Japanese to do, any increase in Japanese imports of rice might well 
come from Thailand or China rather than from the United States. 
10.3.1 
Are the issues raised by Japan’s low imports and high exports two 
separate concerns, or are they linked aspects of a single developmental 
policy? Some argue that market closure, along with government assis- 
tance for generic research and development projects, was an essential 
element of  the Japanese  national  policy  responsible  for subsequent 
export successes in motor vehicles and electronics. l5 
Moreover, as described in the previous section, Japan’s overall trade 
balance is determined largely by macroeconomic influences. Any broad 
import-inhibiting factors, whether national policy or industrial practice, 
ought therefore  also to inhibit exports. Conversely, any  successful 
move to liberalize imports will  likewise promote exports-although 
this is hardly a result US.  trade negotiators are likely to stress.i6 
A third link between exports and imports arises from Japan’s poor 
endowment of natural resources. For any given trade balance consistent 
with  macroeconomic  conditions, Japan’s heavy  dependence  on im- 
ported oil and food means a correspondingly larger surplus on trade 
in manufactures (or in services-but  Japan currently runs a deficit on 
services trade).” Still, the required surplus could be achieved through 
higher-than-average manufactured exports, as in the case of West Ger- 
many, rather than lower-than-average manufactured imports (Lawrence 
1987). 
Perhaps more important than the direct effect on the composition of 
Japan’s trade flows, perennial dependence on imports of raw materials 
and food  has  shaped national  attitudes, public  and private,  toward 
importing. To  many Japanese, their economy’s extreme vulnerability 
to changes in global market conditions, both for raw material imports 
such as oil and for manufactured exports, casts an omnipresent shadow 
over today’s prosperity. 
10.3.2  Japan’s Low Import Share 
In terms of conventional trade-distorting government practices, Ja- 
pan was formerly a major offender among industrial nations but now 
must be  counted  as one of  the most  open.18 Foreign products  and 
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services, from IBM to McDonald’s, are to be found everywhere. Yet 
the Japanese ratio of imports to gross national product, and especially 
of  manufactured  imports to total imports, remains  strikingly low  in 
comparison to other industrial countries. Many of the “foreign” goods 
now  so conspicuous in Japanese daily life are in fact produced  do- 
mestically by  local affiliates or licensees of foreign companies. 
Are the low import ratios evidence of subtle trade barriers or simply 
a reflection of transport costs and an atypical factor endowment? Much 
of  the evidence on Japan’s  “hidden”  barriers to entry is anecdotal 
(e.g., Rapp  1986; Balassa  1986). While attesting to real frustrations 
experienced by U.S. producers in their attempts to serve a potentially 
lucrative market, such anecdotes provide little indication of  whether 
public or private action in Japan differs significantly from that in, say, 
France. Christopher (1986) goes further, suggesting that while disap- 
pointed would-be exporters have clear motives for making their griev- 
ances known, successful  U.S.  exporters and direct investors wisely 
shun publicity. Kept from the public eye, their successes-and  resulting 
profits-are  less likely to promote further entry by competing U.S. 
producers. If so, anecdotal evidence may be a seriously biased measure 
of import barriers. 
10.3.3  Econometric Evidence 
Several researchers  have used  econometric methods to determine 
whether Japan’s trade structure is basically a reflection of relative costs 
or has been shaped significantly by  hidden but important barriers to 
imports. Starting from standard models linking trade patterns to na- 
tional factor endowments and other determinants of relative cost, these 
researchers  examine the deviations of actual trade flows from those 
predicted by the underlying model. 
While based on different specifications, data, and time periods, stud- 
ies by Saxonhouse (1983, 1985), Bergsten and Cline (1983, and Noland 
(1987) all found Japanese trade to be adequately explained by the same 
basic determinants as that of other areas, thus rejecting a major role 
for import barriers in Japan compared to its trading partners. In con- 
trast, Balassa (1986) found significant shortfalls of Japanese imports 
relative to values predicted from a model very similar to Bergsten and 
Cline’s. Noland conjectures that the conflicting results reflect differ- 
ences in the samples and in the definitions of the independent variables 
but emphasizes that neither set of regressions is derived from a formal 
model. Deviations of actual from predicted values, ascribed by Balassa 
to trade policies applied, may  simply indicate misspecification of the 
regression equation. 
Noland’s own regression equations are derived from an explicit two- 
sector  model  incorporating  differentiated  products  and  scale  econ- 
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of international trade (e.g., Helpman and Krugman 1985). Despite the 
different theoretical underpinnings,  Noland draws basically the same 
conclusion as Saxonhouse and Bergsten and Cline, that Japanese ex- 
ports, imports, and total trade “do not appear to be out of the ordi- 
nary.”  But in interpreting  his own results as well as those of earlier 
researchers, Noland  emphasizes the need for caution in making any 
strong inference from the size of residuals, given uncertainty as to 
specification of the “true model.”Iy 
Although  intended  to cast light  on the extent of Japan’s sectoral 
barriers to imports, the studies by Bergsten and Cline, Balassa, and 
Noland all used  aggregate trade data, while the one by  Saxonhouse 
employed industry data but focused on net exports rather than imports. 
To focus directly on sectoral anomalies, Lawrence (1987) used import, 
export, and production data for twenty-two manufacturing industries. 
Like Noland, Lawrence adopted a theoretical framework incorporating 
differentiated products and scale economies. However, while Noland 
treated manufacturing as a single sector, in the Lawrence model each 
manufacturing industry produces a separate differentiated product. 
The critical step in Lawrence’s analysis is the assumption that tastes 
are similar across countries. With the additional assumption  of no trans- 
port costs or trade barriers, a country’s share in each market will then 
be proportional to its share in world  production  and independent of 
the size of the aggregate trade balance; larger countries will thus be 
more “closed”  as measured by trade flows as a share of GNP. The 
implied relationship between a country’s production and trade in each 
industry is used by Lawrence to infer the existence of “unusual  bar- 
riers”  to imports at the industry level. 
Lawrence’s data show that the industrialized countries are remark- 
ably similar in patterns of domestic production and use (consumption 
plus investment) by industry.  Contrary to the conventional  wisdom, 
Japan is not unusual in its overall export performance, although Japan’s 
manufactured exports are highly  concentrated in a small number of 
industries. But Japan is  atypical in its low manufactured imports and 
the very minor extent of intra-industry trade. From his regression anal- 
ysis of industry trade and production  data, Lawrence concludes that 
“unusual barriers reduce Japanese imports of manufactured goods sub- 
stantially-by  about forty percent.”  As Lawrence notes, his results are 
not  inconsistent  with  Noland’s  finding  of  no significant anomaly  in 
Japan’s  aggregate trade. Since manufactured goods were less than a 
quarter of Japan’s total imports in 1980, substantial “underimporting” 
in some sectors could be masked by the use of aggregate data. 
Despite his striking result, Lawrence casts doubt on sectoral trade 
liberalization as a cure-all for aggregate imbalances, suggesting that the 
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offset by an associated rise in exports. Thus, the main effect would be 
an expansion of  Japan’s intra-industry trade, rather than  a dramatic 
reduction in the nation’s surplus on trade in  manufactured goods. A 
more basic issue is, as with  the earlier studies, the extent to which 
Japan’s import shortfalls from Lawrence’s predicted values reflect model 
misspecification or errors in variables (e.g., transport costs, for which 
Lawrence used mileage) rather than import barriers. 
10.3.4  Lack of Intra-Industry Trade 
A somewhat different argument made by Borrus and Zysman (1985) 
also takes as its starting point Japan’s atypically  low level of  intra- 
industry trade. Borrus and Zysman point to the virtual absence of two- 
way trade in specific manufactured products: Japan tends not to import 
the manufactured goods that it exports. 
According to Borrus and Zysman, past protection from imports has 
allowed Japanese producers to achieve a decisive competitive advan- 
tage. Indeed, the resulting advantage is so great that even when import 
barriers are no longer in  place, foreign firms are unable to penetrate 
the domestic market, while Japanese firms can quickly displace other 
suppliers in the United States and third-country markets.*” But Borrus 
and Zysman supply no evidence that Japan’s intra-product and intra- 
industry trade are systematically depressed in sectors previously pro- 
tected by import barriers. Although the cases of semiconductors and 
autos are suggestive, generalization to manufacturing as a whole re- 
quires further support. 
A more fundamental issue is, as with any post hoc ergo propter hoc 
argument, the lack of evidence establishing that past protection of the 
Japanese domestic market from imports played a key role in developing 
present technological superiority. If a large and profitable market were 
the main  necessary condition for developing a decisive competitive 
advantage, U.S. automakers, not Japanese, ought to dominate world 
markets today. That the Japanese experience with import substitution 
actually  ended with internationally  competitive production and ter- 
mination of  infant industry protection  makes  it an exception to the 
global norm. But if the Japanese experience is so different from what 
has been observed with import substitution elsewhere, perhaps other 
Japanese policies, not barriers to imports, were the essential ingredient. 
10.4  The U.S.  Technology Race with Japan 
A persistent technology gap between  the  United  States and other 
industrialized nations shaped the nation’s trade in manufactured goods 
for several decades after World War 11. Over this period, large public 
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continuing flow of  new products and processes.  Early access to this 
superior technology allowed U.S. firms to remain internationally com- 
petitive despite labor costs far in excess of those abroad. As late as 
1980, the U.S. trade position in high-technology manufacturing was 
still rising almost every year, while net trade in other manufacturing 
followed an opposite trend. 
10.4.1  Closing the Technology Gap 
The breakdown of trading relationships based on U.S. technological 
superiority reflected several major changes in the global economic en- 
vironment. First, other industrial nations, impressed by U.S. economic 
gains from technology-driven growth, stepped up their own R&D ex- 
penditures. Some of the funds went for basic research, but much was 
used to speed the acquisition and adaptation of technology from abroad, 
especially from  the  United  States. At the same time, dramatic im- 
provements in  communications and transportation  helped to interna- 
tionalize both research and production activities. 
The growth of U.S. multinational corporations served as an impor- 
tant vehicle for the international transfer of new commercial technol- 
ogies, providing not only access to proprietary technological information 
but also to the know-how and financial capital needed to implement 
the new technologies. The technology-disseminating activities of multi- 
nationals, while profit  motivated,  were  in  many  cases actively en- 
couraged by host countries’ policies toward direct investments. 
The closing of the technology gap between the United States and its 
commercial rivals meant increased competition on other dimensions of 
cost. Labor productivity and earnings rose rapidly abroad, while the 
growth of U.S. earnings slowed. Although the catch-up abroad prob- 
ably benefited the nation as a whole by raising foreign demand for U.S. 
goods and services and by opening the possibility of importing as well 
as exporting new technologies, some U.S. workers clearly lost ground. 
In a number of  U.S. manufacturing industries, real earnings actually 
fell for the first time in the postwar period as U.S.  producers attempted 
to remain internationally competitive. 
10.4.2  Japan’s Technological Development 
In contrast to most other industrial nations, Japan virtually excluded 
foreign investments in  industries targeted for development during its 
period of technological catch-up. Instead, it relied primarily on licens- 
ing to acquire critical technologies from abroad. Imports of technology 
were controlled by  the Ministry of  International Trade and Industry 
(MITI), which prepared lists of desired technologies and reviewed most 
licensing proposals.21  As a supplement to MITI’s role as “doorkeeper” 
to technology imports, the Ministry of Finance ensured access of  in- 
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Some developing countries have modeled their own policies toward 
imported technologies on those of Japan, particularly screening of li- 
censing agreements and allocation of  capital. However, none are in a 
position to duplicate the commitment of skilled workers that facilitated 
Japan’s success in adapting imported technologies.  In  1969, two de- 
cades into its catch-up phase, Japan employed about thirty scientists 
and engineers per ten thousand workers in  the labor force, less than 
half the comparable figure for the United States but similar to the major 
European nations (Science and  Technology Data Book  1987, 37-38). 
Fifteen years later the Japanese proportion of scientists and engineers 
in the work force had more than doubled, closely approaching the U.S. 
figure, while the European nations had more modest increases. Japa- 
nese spending for research and development (R&D) tells a similar story. 
Although Japan is only average among industrial nations in its overall 
proportion of gross national product devoted to R&D, it now enjoys 
the world’s highest ratio of nondefense R&D to GNP. 
As with  trade  in  manufactured  goods, Japan  has in  recent  years 
greatly liberalized its policies toward technology imports while rapidly 
expanding its own technology exports. Japan’s “technological balance 
of  payments,”  recording  payments  and receipts  of  royalties  and  li- 
censing fees for the use of trademarks, copyrights, and patents, still 
shows a large deficit. However, this is mainly a reflection of agreements 
made  in  earlier years during Japan’s catch-up phase. Japan’s gross 
receipts from technology exports have grown steadily. By 1984 Japan 
was the third,  after the  United  States and the  United  Kingdom,  in 
earnings from foreign use of its technology (Japan 1986, 26). 
Like  other  technologically  advanced  nations,  Japan  has  also  in- 
creased its direct investments abroad, pairing financial capital, superior 
technology, and managerial know-how with the lower labor costs of 
developing countries. Current or anticipated import barriers have pro- 
vided the main motivation for recent Japanese direct investments in 
the other industrialized nations, but even these investments may entail 
substantial transfers of te~hnology.~~  For Japanese investments in U.S. 
high-technology industries, there is likely to be a two-way flow, with 
the Japanese gaining speedier access to state-of-the-art technical  in- 
formation while themselves disseminating superior methods of  man- 
agement and organization. 
10.4.3  Japanese Productivity and Trade 
Bilateral comparisons of  industry-level productivity  and trade per- 
formance confirm Japan’s catch-up to the technological level of  the 
United States. In their comparison of productivity  levels for twenty- 
eight industries, Jorgenson, Kuroda, and Nishimizu (1987) found that 
by  1979 nine Japanese industries had already closed the productivity 
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difference narrowed over the period  studied. The analysis indicated 
that Japan’s rising productivity levels were strongly influenced by major 
increases in the relative capital intensity of production as well as im- 
proved technology. 
A recent study of U.S.-Japanese trade patterns in  1977 (Audretsch 
and Yamawaki 1986) found bilateral U.S.-Japanese trade structurally 
different from trade between the United States and other countries. In 
contrast to the consistent empirical result that U.S. export strength is 
greatest in the high-technology industries with relatively large employ- 
ment of skilled workers, U.S. trade performance in its bilateral trade 
with Japan was negatively related to the skill level of the U.S. labor 
force. A possible interpretation of this finding is that at least in trade 
with Japan, the U.S. technological lead is no longer an important factor; 
an abundance of skilled workers and a lower wage premium for tech- 
nical skills can give Japan a cost advantage over the United States in 
these industries. 
However, the experience of Japanese-owned auto plants in the United 
States has shown that neither massive capital investments nor state- 
of-the-art technologies are essential ingredients of  the Japanese cost 
advantage. In autos, Japanese producers operating in the United States 
have achieved lower costs than their indigenous counterparts while 
typically using less capital per  worker and no highly advanced pro- 
duction technology. This raises the possibility that at least in the auto 
industry, a significant aspect of the Japanese competitive advantage is 
“technological” only in a very broad sense that includes organizational 
and managerial know-how. 
But recent findings of Lipsey and Kravis (1986) suggest that Japan’s 
advantage in auto production may not be typical. In terms of overall 
manufacturing  exports,  Lipsey  and  Kravis  found  that  U.S.  multi- 
national corporations have maintained a virtually unchanged share of 
world totals since 1966; declining exports from U.S. production have 
been offset by rising exports from subsidiaries abroad. These results 
imply that loss of U.S. international competitiveness in manufacturing 
as a whole cannot be attributed to deficiencies in  U.S. management 
skills or technology. However, in the case of transport equipment, the 
United  States did lose substantial ground; by  1983, both the  United 
States as a country and U.S. multinationals had lost about a quarter 
of their 1966 global market shares.24 
10.5  Looking Ahead 
Japan’s rapid growth during much of the postwar period has been 
based on technological catch-up. The slowing of  that growth in recent 
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Can the Japanese policies  and institutions  that facilitated  successful 
importation and adaptation of existing technologies  work as well  in 
producing new ones? Some claim that the Japanese educational system, 
in comparison to its U.S.  counterpart, ensures a uniformly high stan- 
dard of performance but systematically crushes individuality and crea- 
tivity. However, it is too early to judge whether these differences have 
any implications for scientific innovation, and in any case both systems 
are in the throes of significant change. The increasing economic inti- 
macy between the two nations has itself served as one major impetus 
for change. 
I have argued that the rapidly growing bilateral imbalances between 
the United States and Japan were produced by macroeconomic con- 
ditions, not trade or industrial policies. In this sense, the imbalances 
can be viewed as “temporary”  factors rather than long-term devel- 
opments. But elimination of the imbalances without serious damage to 
the U.S. economy and those of its trading partners may be difficult to 
achieve. If Japanese investors turn away from U.S. financial markets 
before the United States is able to reduce domestic absorption, U.S. 
interest rates will  be forced upward, with potentially disastrous con- 
sequences for the economy. 
In terms of sectoral adjustments, the U.S.-Japanese  relationship may 
well be entering a new phase. As the nations grow  more  similar in 
terms of technology base, abundance of capital and skilled labor, and 
per capita income, intra-industry trade is likely to grow. In particular, 
two-way trade in technology and in technology-based services should 
become increasingly important as Japan moves from adaptation into 
innovation.  In the mature industries and even in  some that are now 
considered “high-technology”  sectors, both Japan and the United States 
will be faced with increasing competition from a new tier of competitors 
in Asia and elsewhere. 
For both nations, problems of sectoral adjustment will continue to 
generate strong pressures for import protection and other forms of 
assistance to industries  losing ground to newcomers. Sectoral trade 
conflict between the United States and Japan will be concentrated on 
the two ends of the industrial spectrum in terms of technological  so- 
phistication, with issues raised both by contrasting approaches to the 
phasing out of industries losing their comparative advantage and by 
contrasting approaches to the nurturing of new industries. 
Could the United States return to its one-time position of unques- 
tioned  technological  preeminence? Even  with  vastly  increased  re- 
sources allocated to research and development, this kind of advantage 
probably  can no  longer be sustained-by  the United  States or any 
country-in  a world that has become highly interdependent. The com- 
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the greatly increased speed with which new technical knowledge be- 
comes available to potential competitors all over the globe. This does 
not mean that research and development have become less important. 
On the contrary, technological improvements will continue to provide 
the basis for a rising standard of  living both in  the United States and 
abroad. However, the benefits of R&D efforts can no longer be counted 
mainly in terms of  the advantages conferred to one nation’s industries 
over competitors elsewhere. 
Notes 
1.  In August  1987, National Semiconductor Corporation announced that it 
would buy Fairchild-at  what industry analysts described as a bargain price, 
far less than that offered earlier by Fujitsu. National was one of several U.S. 
companies that opposed the sale to Fujitsu. 
2.  For a summary of the practical difficulties in using trade policy “strate- 
gically”  to promote national advantage, see Richardson  1986. 
3. See McCulloch and Richardson 1986, 61 -64.  Although protectionist mea- 
sures are traditionally  condemned as beggar-thy-neighbor policies, in reality 
they often turn out to be beggar-thy-brother  policies, impairing performance 
of other industries in  the same country. This is an important distinction for 
public servants, who seem relatively unconcerned about costs inflicted outside 
the nation’s (or even the congressional district’s) borders. For some examples 
of undercutting indirect effects of trade restrictions, see Baldwin 1982. 
4. An opposite argument is sometimes made by analysts concerned about 
deindustrialization of the U.S.  economy. They believe that foreign targeting 
of basic and high-technology  manufacturing industries reduces U.S.  employ- 
ment opportunities in “high-value-added”  activities. But high value added per 
worker may simply reflect firms’ optimizing responses to strong unions, rather 
than a technological characteristic of the industry. It is far from obvious that 
national policy ought to bolster the resulting wage advantage by limiting im- 
ports.  In  the case of  steel, probably  the industry  most  frequently  targeted 
worldwide, employment in the United States and other industrialized countries 
has dropped dramatically while wages remain well above the U.S. average for 
comparable skills and experience. 
5. Moreover, even the existence of a real distortion does not assure that 
“corrective”  policies will actually make things better rather than worse. Ex- 
amples such as textiles and apparel, steel, autos, and semiconductors suggest 
that cartelization, not active competition based on comparative advantage, is 
the likely outcome of sectoral policy initiatives. 
6. Relative to gross national product, the Canadian surplus on trade with the 
United States actually exceeds Japan’s. But in early  1987, Canadian govern- 
ment statisticians showed that U.S. recording procedures have systematically 
missed certain U.S. exports, particularly those transported by truck into Can- 
ada. U.S.  statistics have thus overstated the U.S.  merchandise trade deficit 
and particularly the bilateral deficit with Canada. 
7. McCulloch  1985 and McCulloch and Richardson  1986 examine in detail 
the types of  policies  usually recommended to restore U.S.  competitiveness 327  United States-Japan  Economic Relations 
and evaluate their likely effects (or lack of effects) on the nation’s overall trade 
balance or current account. 
8. On supply-side hysteresis effects arising from economies of scale and sunk 
costs, see Baldwin 1986. 
9. See Frankel  1984  for a review of  this agreement. The agreement was 
promoted as a means to raise the value of the yen by increasing its role as a 
reserve currency.  However, the predictable  short-run result, borne out by 
subsequent events, was just the opposite. 
10. The assumption that net capital inflows are independent of current earn- 
ings on past investments is, however,  suspect. Tax  law in the United States 
and some other nations tends to favor reinvestment abroad of current earnings 
from foreign  investments.  Other governmental  policies  toward international 
capital transactions may also link the rate of new investment to current interest 
and profits. 
I I. An ongoing debate concerns the relative effects of tax-financed and bond- 
financed government expenditures. The issues are complex, hinging on such 
imponderables as the public’s anticipation of future changes in tax rates. An 
extreme view is that, because of public anticipation of future tax liability, bond- 
financed  spending has the same overall effect on today’s absorption as tax- 
financed spending. 
12. Saxonhouse 1985 characterizes the Japanese as “notorious target sav- 
ers,” with future housing a main target. This is a critical point, since increased 
spending in any one category does not necessarily translate into higher overall 
spending  (lower saving). Saxonhouse also  notes a possible  bonus from in- 
creased housing expenditures for other spending: more living space may lift a 
major constraint on purchases of consumer durables. 
13. This has been  proposed  in  recent years  by James Tobin and Rudiger 
Dornbusch, among others. See Dornbusch and Frankel  1987. 
14. Conversely, a return to a more “normal”  pattern of global capital flows 
should reduce sectoral frictions. Krugman  1986 and Petri 1987 use this logic 
to anticipate some reversal of recent competitive pressures on U.S. industry. 
Based  on simulation analysis,  Petri concludes that output structures in  the 
United States and Japan could become quite similar by the 1990s. 
15.  For example, this argument is  made by  Borrus, Tyson, and Zysman 
(1987) for the case of the semiconductor industry. 
16. If sectoral liberalization does reduce aggregate Japanese savings, as sug- 
gested by  Rapp 1986 and Balassa  1986, the induced rise in Japanese exports 
would not fully offset the rise in imports. 
17. Krugman  1986 links the “Japan problem”  of rapid growth of manufac- 
tured exports to the United States to large increases in world oil prices from 
1973 until  1984. His analysis suggests that lower oil prices will translate into 
a higher value of the yen and slower  growth of Japanese manufactured exports. 
18.  Komiya and Itoh 1986 provides a detailed account of the gradual liber- 
alization of Japanese imports. Saxonhouse 1983 and 1985 document the minor 
importance currently of conventional instruments of protection.  Ahearn 1985 
divides current Japanese import barriers into four categories: formal, regula- 
tory, strategic, and business and cultural. He  concludes that the most onerous 
remaining  barriers  to manufactured  imports are in  the last category,  where 
Japanese public policy has relatively little direct impact. 
19. Learner 1984 gives a more comprehensive discussion of both specification 
issues and data problems associated with empirically relating resource endow- 
ments to trade patterns, also emphasizing the problem of sensitivity. While he 328  Rachel McCulloch 
acknowledges the probable importance of scale economies, for practical rea- 
sons his own specification is based on a model with constant returns. Learner 
does not focus on the existence of significant distortions but concludes from 
his analysis that resource endowments provide a “surprisingly good” expla- 
nation of the trade data. 
20. Although Lawrence’s data support the contention that Japanese intra- 
industry trade in manufactured goods is unusually low, he attributes this finding 
to remaining current barriers to imports, not technological advantages resulting 
from past protection. 
21. Harris 1985 gives a comprehensive review of past and current Japanese 
policies toward international technology transfers. 
22. Yamamura 1986 suggests that the role of the Ministry of Finance (MOF) 
was perhaps the most essential element of Japan’s progrowth  policy in this 
period. Given the underdeveloped  state of Japanese domestic capital markets, 
their  insulation from world  financial markets, and regulated  below-market- 
clearing interest rates on loans, MOF exercised enormous economic leverage 
over  domestic firms as a consequence of its ability to  allocate loans in a situation 
of chronic excess demand. 
23. Bhagwati 1982 has pointed out that some direct foreign investments may 
be used in heading off new protection rather than in anticipation of producing 
inside the restricted market. 
24.  The atypical performance of the auto industry  relative to U.S.  manu- 
facturing as a whole points up the danger in generalizing from the experience 
of  a single sector, even a very important one, as Halberstam 1986 does in 
comparing Ford and Nissan. 
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Comment  Robert W.  Staiger 
Rachel McCulloch’s chapter on the state of United States-Japan  eco- 
nomic relations provides  an excellent synthesis of an important and 
complex relationship, a synthesis from which  I  learned a great deal 
and can add very little. While covering both  aggregate and sectoral 
sources of friction between the two countries, McCulloch is careful to 
keep these two broad issues separate. This is important for two reasons. 
First, the current high degree of friction between Japan and the United 
States stems predominantly  from an  aggregate imbalance, and  may 
therefore be expected to decline in large part as the aggregate imbalance 
declines. Second, from the perspective of policy design, it is important 
to address the aggregate imbalance with aggregate policies that affect 
national absorption and/or income, reserving the use of sectoral policies 
for the pursuit of sectoral goals. But  I  would like to suggest several 
reasons  why  it  may  be  appropriate in the  midst of  large aggregate 
imbalances  for there  to be  heightened  U.S.  interest  in the  sectoral 
aspects of  the United States-Japan  relationship, though this attention 
should not be viewed as a way to address the aggregate issues, and 
why now may be a good time to take a hard look at both the sectoral 
policies of  these countries and the importance for each country of the 
sectoral composition of  its productive activity. 
The first reason  concerns the effect of the large U.S. trade deficit 
on the bargaining position of the United States with regard to tariff and 
nontariff barriers in Japan. The political pressure in the United States 
for protection has grown with the size of the U.S. trade deficit, making 
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credible the  promise  of  protectionist measures  if  the  United  States 
cannot come to an agreement with its trading partners on the rules for 
a free and fair trading environment. This increased credibility augments 
the ability of  the United States to gain trade concessions in the form 
of more open international markets, and ought to heighten the interest 
in identifying and determining the importance of existing trade barriers. 
Of course, there is no guarantee that this change in bargaining power 
will lead to more open trade: it is perhaps more likely that VERs and 
other forms of managed trade will  be the result. Nonetheless, the link 
between aggregate and sectoral issues is likely to be strong, and for 
this reason renewed focus on just what sectoral barriers to trade remain 
seems appropriate. 
The second reason concerns the permanence of  the changes in the 
sectoral composition of production in Japan and the United States that 
have come about as a result of the temporary aggregate imbalance. It 
is quite possible that the sectoral makeup of  U.S. production will  be 
substantially altered long after the close of the “introductory  sale” of 
many foreign products in U.S. markets brought on by the great real 
appreciation of the dollar in the first half of the 1980s. If these sectoral 
changes do prove to be permanent, then whether the United States (or 
any other country) should be Concerned with the sectoral composition 
of  its productive activity takes on an added importance whenever an 
aggregate imbalance arises. 
In short, whether and to what extent Japan distorts its trade patterns 
seems especially relevant now, not because the elimination of  those 
distortions will have a predictable effect on Japan’s aggregate imbal- 
ance, but because Japan’s aggregate imbalance with the United States 
should strengthen the U.S. bargaining position with regard to sectoral 
issues. And whether the United States should be concerned about the 
sectoral composition of its production should be a question of intense 
interest now, since the current U.S.  trade deficit is likely to have an 
impact on the sectoral makeup of production in the United States long 
after the aggregate imbalance subsides. 
Japan’s Distorting Policies 
Though anecdotal evidence abounds concerning the alleged height 
of Japan’s trade barriers, quantitative support for this claim is harder 
to come by. Indeed, with one exception, the econometric studies re- 
viewed by McCulloch reject the notion that the trade patterns of Japan 
are more distorted than those of other countries. These studies avoid 
attempts to actually measure existing trade barriers, choosing instead 
to infer the existence of trade restrictions from the unexplained portion 
of standard trade equations applied to the trade of various countries. 
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across countries and time, relates each country’s trade  flows to its 
factor endowments and looks for country-specific fixed effects in each 
commodity equation. His econometric evidence suggests a relatively 
minor role for Japan-specific fixed effects, a result interpreted as in- 
dicating the absence of uncommonly high barriers to trade in Japan. 
While such studies are certainly useful, their interpretation becomes 
more clouded if a country’s trade barriers are thought to be related to 
its factor endowments (as in, for example, Magee and Young 1987). If 
this is the case, much of the effect of  trade barriers may already be 
captured in the equation’s coefficients on factor endowments, and test- 
ing for an additional country-specific fixed effects may yield  little in 
the way of information on uncommonly high trade restrictions. This is 
not to say that these studies are not valuable, but I would have more 
confidence in their conclusions if other approaches to analyzing relative 
distortions yielded broadly similar results. 
Having said this, I mention briefly the results of a project undertaken 
by Alan Deardorff, Robert Stern, and myself on the distortions intro- 
duced by Japanese tariff and nontariff barriers (see Staiger, Deardorff, 
and Stern 1987). We  estimated the distortionary effects of existing tariff 
and nontariff barriers in Japan and in the United States by  simulating 
trade flows in the absence of trade barriers using the Michigan Com- 
putational  Model of  World  Production and Trade. Several available 
estimates of existing trade restrictions in Japan and the United States 
were used  alternatively  in an attempt to acknowledge the inevitable 
inaccuracy of any one measure, and the results reported below were 
robust to these various measures. Taking the simulated changes in trade 
patterns that would arise if existing protection were dropped, we cal- 
culated the factor content of these changes and provided a theoretical 
argument for why relative changes in the factor content of trade should 
be related to changes in relative factor prices. Our results, then, con- 
cern the distortions in relative factor prices brought about by Japanese 
policy as compared to the distortions associated with U.S. policy, and 
can be summarized in three points: 
Comparing the effects of  each  country’s trade policy on its own 
factor markets,  Japanese  policy is  more  distortionary  than  U.S. 
policy. 
Comparing the effects of  each country’s trade policy country by 
country, Japanese policy is again more distortionary than U.S. pol- 
icy. In particular, Japanese tariff and nontariff barriers distort U.S. 
factor markets to a larger degree than do the trade policies of  the 
United States itself. 
In Japan, farm workers are the biggest relative gainers from existing 
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the biggest relative gainers, and farmers the biggest relative losers, 
from existing protection. 
These results support the conclusion that Japan’s trade policy may 
indeed  have uncommonly  high  distortionary  effects  on U.  S. factor 
markets, and that the United  States-Japan  sectoral issues may be a 
legitimate source of friction.  But equally important is the point that, 
according to our results, Japanese trade policy actually has a favorable 
effect on workers in the U.S. manufacturing sector relative to other 
factors in the U.S.  economy: as such, the recent decline in the U.S. 
manufacturing sector relative to other sectors is not attributable to the 
tariff and nontariff policies of Japan. 
Sectoral Composition of Production 
The concern over changes in the composition of  U.S. production 
that have come about as the world becomes more integrated has often, 
though not exclusively, focused on the effects of  Japanese policy in 
contributing to these changes. Such concerns have generated a great 
deal of scholarly interest in whether a country can gain by  having, or 
having  more  of, a certain  sector  operating  within  its  borders.  As 
McCulloch points out, while  theory  raises this  possibility, no  clear 
evidence exists on whether such concerns are in fact well founded. Yet 
the answer to this question takes on an added importance now if, as 
seems likely, many of  the changes in  sectoral market share brought 
about by the large U.S. trade imbalance will persist long into the future. 
This brings up the important question, noted by McCulloch, of whether 
the United States is too cautious in its pursuit of trade policy, and the 
possibility that by waiting for “clear evidence,” further delays in re- 
versing present trends may  leave the United  States at  a permanent 
disadvantage. 
Here I suggest that the United States would not be overly cautious 
in continuing to wait for further and better evidence before pursuing 
activist trade policies to affect the sectoral composition of U.S. output. 
While the recent trade/IO results have shown under a variety of  cir- 
cumstances that activist trade policies can in  principle raise national 
welfare from its free trade level,  they  have also demonstrated  how 
carefully such policies must be designed: the form of  welfare-improving 
intervention will  hinge on the characteristics of  the industry consid- 
ered, and trade policy must be determined on a case by  case basis. 
Unfortunately, the kind of  discretion and flexibility with which an in- 
stitution pursuing such trade policies must be endowed is likely to un- 
dermine its ability to augment national welfare, both because of the 
institution’s heightened risk of becoming the servant of special interest 
groups, and because of its likely inability to credibly pursue the optimal 334  Rachel McCulloch 
trade policies that rationalize its existence. As such, even if there exist 
good reasons to be concerned about the changes in sectoral compo- 
sition of  national output brought about by  the U.S. trade imbalance, 
it is not at all clear what, if  anything, should be done. 
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Comment  Peter A. Petri 
Rachel McCulloch’s treatment of the “Japan problem” is comprehen- 
sive, balanced, and analytically rigorous-a  welcome addition to the 
growing and often frustrating body of literature in this area. Refresh- 
ingly, the chapter has no ax to grind-say,  against recalcitrant Japanese 
bureaucrats or impotent American exporters-and  no simple solutions 
to offer. The present crisis is attributed to macroeconomic forces, and 
in particular to the U.S.  tax cut and the decline in the rate of investment 
in Japan. There is no promise of an early resolution, since the under- 
lying macroeconomic imbalances call for difficult-to-swing changes in 
the levels of absorption in the United States and Japan. 
Since this conference brings together sophisticated trade specialists, 
it is appropriate that the chapter begins by asking Is there really a Japan 
problem? McCulloch never explicitly answers this question, but the 
reader is left with the impression that there is no economic problem, 
in the sense that economic events are roughly in line with the (some- 
times ex post) predictions of  theory. In turn, the root of  the political 
problem-the  large U.S. bilateral deficit-is  the result of  temporary 
macroeconomic forces rather than other potential factors such as tech- 
nological rivalry, nontariff barriers, or cultural differences. Even with 
the caveats surrounding the required macroeconomic adjustments, this 
is an optimistic message: after a few years of  macroeconomic adjust- 
Peter A. Petri is associate professor of economics at Brandeis University. 335  United States-Japan  Economic Relations 
ments, Japan-bashing may become nothing more than an unpleasant 
memory. 
Unfortunately, the opposite case is also reasonable. United States- 
Japan trade  may  always tend  to be  politicized-creating  continuing 
friction that tends to flash into crisis in the appropriate macroeconomic 
context. This more pessimistic view rests on the argument that certain 
characteristics of the United States-Japan  economic relationship make 
it unusually prone to political intervention, regardless of the economic 
logic of actual trade and capital flows. Thus, there is apolitical economy 
Japan  problem-a  persistent,  undesirable  interaction  between  eco- 
nomic variables and political behavior. The economic structure of the 
relationship just does not seem conducive to political peace and leads 
to chronic pressure for government management of bilateral trade. 
Since McCulloch’s chapter concentrates on purely economic issues, 
it is perhaps useful to focus these comments explicitly on the political 
economy perspective. Why is there so much conflict between the United 
States and Japan when in fact the United  States runs a larger trade 
deficit (relative to GNP) with Canada and several other countries? Why 
was there  sharp conflict as early as the late  1960s, well  before  the 
spectacular macroeconomic imbalances of  the 1980s? Why is such a 
large proportion of bilateral trade (in textiles, steel, automobiles, chem- 
icals, and  semiconductors) managed  by  either one or both  govern- 
ments? The answers to these questions must be sought in the scale and 
structure of  United States-Japan  trade. 
To begin with, the bilateral trading relationship is inherently imbal- 
anced. The United States has run a bilateral trade deficit with Japan 
since 1965, and the ratio of U.S.  exports to Japan to U.S.  imports from 
Japan was already below .6 in the early 1970s. The exporthmport ratio 
hovered in the .5-.6 range until 1983, when it began a decline toward 
today’s 0.32. Detailed analysis of the specialization patterns of the two 
countries (e.g.,  Petri  1984, chap. 5) suggests that a substantial U.S. 
bilateral deficit would emerge even when both countries’ overall trade 
is  balanced. There is nothing surprising or even  significant about a 
bilateral deficit-except  for its political economy implications. 
A large bilateral deficit tends to tip political scales toward bilateral 
protection. In the case of  balanced trade, the weight of intense pro- 
tectionist  interests (import-competing producers) is counterbalanced 
by  that of  intense trading interests (export producers) and to a lesser 
extent by that of  diffuse trading interests (consumers). In the case of 
highly imbalanced trade, however, the absence of intense trading in- 
terests (the exporters’ lobby) leaves the overall political balance vul- 
nerable to protection. At present, domestic producer support for free 
bilateral trade  is very  thin and is  not adequately replaced  by  direct 
Japanese  lobbying efforts. (Incidentally, the declining importance of 336  Rachel McCulloch 
exports in overall U.S. trade has also contributed to a general increase 
in protectionist pressures.) 
Imbalanced trade not only makes protection more likely, but also 
less risky. With imbalanced trade, the deficit country has the advantage 
of an asymmetric threat. In principle, U.S. discriminatory trade action 
against Japan could be subject to multilateral retaliation under GATT 
rules. In practice this is extremely unlikely, and U.S. policymakers will 
seldom look beyond Japan’s relatively modest direct counterthreats. 
Other structural features of  United  States-Japan  trade exacerbate 
the problem.  U.S. imports from Japan are dominated  by  politically 
important industries such as automobiles and semiconductors, and ear- 
lier, textiles and steel; research on the determinants of protection has 
shown that these large, concentrated industries are more apt to win 
protection than smaller, more competitive industries such as footwear 
(Lavergne 1983). In addition, the sectoral impact of imports from Japan 
is unusually intense because of  their scale and high product concen- 
tration. 
Finally, imports from Japan are more visible and protection-prone 
than  other imports because  they  often consist of  products  that  the 
United States did not previously import or perhaps even exported. In 
this context, Japanese exports displace primarily U.S. products rather 
than the products of  other exporters and raise troubling implications 
for long-term competitiveness. Often, the industries affected have (or 
are thought  to have) steep learning curves and concentrated  global 
markets. Thus, requests for trade action against Japan are increasingly 
based  on long-term strategic grounds-along  lines that are now also 
attracting theoretical support from the industrial organization approach 
to trade policy. 
There is no doubt that trade conflict will moderate if  and when the 
present macroeconomic imbalances diminish. But some of the factors 
cited will continue to operate, and I suspect it is too early to declare 
the Japan problem dead. For the foreseeable future, governments are 
likely to remain deeply involved in managing this major bilateral trade 
flow. 
Let me conclude with some observations about the macroeconomics. 
The prospects for an early reduction of  current account imbalances 
may  be  better  than argued in  the chapter. In Japan, the decline  in 
domestic investment rates is largely over, while savings rates are con- 
tinuing to fall. The boom in Japanese asset prices has created a great 
deal of new wealth, especially when evaluated in foreign prices. Con- 
sumption levels are beginning to adjust to this new equation, as evi- 
denced by burgeoning sales of German luxury cars, Korean knitwear, 
and U.S. vacations. In the US.,  it is customary for new administrations 
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fiscal  tightening  is likely in  1989. Private spending reductions could 
also follow; households  and firms have been accumulating  debt for 
several years now in an unusually favorable interest rate environment. 
Indeed, recent exchange rate changes suggest that investors are already 
anticipating a partial reversal of present capital flows.  I 
The trade effects of these macroeconomic adjustments are complex 
and interesting.  It is possible, as I have argued elsewhere, that over 
the next few years the Japanese market will  become the leading ab- 
sorber of the growth of world trade, much as  the U.S. market absorbed 
such growth in the early 1980s. Even this does not necessarily mean 
dramatically higher imports from the United States: Japan’s most rap- 
idly growing imports now are labor-intensive manufactures from East 
Asia and luxury goods from Europe. It is also possible, however, that 
U.S. imports will  stop growing without compensating import growth 
from any other country. This is the scenario for global recession. 
In either case, as Japanese firms accelerate their efforts to replace 
lost markets, they  will  compete aggressively with  U.S. firms in  so- 
phisticated machinery, electronics, and services. In the end, the United 
States and Japan are close competitors in production with similar tastes 
in demand-a  combination that simultaneously breeds vigorous trade 
and keen conflict. 
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